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I. OCCURRENCE
Homeowner's insurance coverage, by its name, is intended to
provide coverage for an insured's home and related risk. However,
homeowner's insurance not only covers the dwelling and other
structures owned by an insured, but also insures against bodily in-
jury and property damage occurrences for which an insured be-
comes liable. Homeowner's insurance does not, however, cover
losses for bodily injury to an insured.' The theory behind exclud-
ing the insured is that homeowners should not cover against every
peril faced by an insured. More importantly, insureds have other
avenues to protect against other losses, such as professional mal-
practice, personal health insurance and automobile insurance.
An emerging issue in liability insurance law is the determina-
tion of what constitutes an "occurrence" for purposes of home-
owner's policy coverage. In an attempt to limit coverage afforded
t Attorney with Rambow Law Firm; Adjunct Professor, William Mitchell
College of Law.
1. Vierkant by Johnson v. AMCO, 543 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996); Minn. Mut. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Manderfeld, 482 N.W.2d 521, 524 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992).
2. E.g., Stone v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1999-CA 000410-
MR, 2000 WL 1005227, at *5 (Ky. Ct. App. July 21, 2000) (holding that an in-
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to insureds and at the same time avoid litigation, many insurance
companies have written their policies with restrictive language.
This restrictive language attempts to narrow ambiguous terms. For
example, Milbank Insurance Company defines "occurrence" in its
homeowner's policy as "an accident, including exposure to condi-
tions, which results, during the policy period in bodily injury or
property damage. "' Auto Owners Insurance Company, on the
other hand, goes further in its definition, stating that an occur-
rence includes "all continuous or repeated exposure to substan-
tially the same generally harmful conditions. 4 Therefore, the Auto
Owners policy would afford more protection to an insured if she
were exposed repeatedly by the same occurrence than would the
Milbank policy. A general homeowner's insurance policy simply
covers losses, bodily injury, property damage and personal injury
"which occur during the policy term. 5 While some policies leave
the definition of loss open to interpretation, many others draft the
policy in an attempt to leave no ambiguity.
Defining language is one tool to simplify the scope of coverage
for insurance policies. While actual coverage in a homeowner's in-
surance policy appears at first glance expansive, litigation has
prompted insurance companies to add exclusions to the policies,
reining in the outer limits of coverage. Insurers have learned the
hard way that ambiguous language can and will be construed
against the policy drafters.6 Therefore, insurance policy drafters
sured's act of fatally shooting his child was not an "occurrence" within the mean-
ing of the liability coverage of a homeowners' insurance policy); Hartford Ins. Co.
of Illinois v. Kelly, 723 N.E.2d 288, 293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that parties to
insurance contract "did not intend to include in the definition of 'occurrence' in-
appropriate sexual misconduct of a minor."); Heile v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.,
No. C-990076, 1999 WL 1203802, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1999) (holding
that defective workmanship was not covered as an accident under policy's defini-
tion of "occurrence."); Westfield Ins. Co. v. Blamer, No. 98AP-1576, 1999 WL
680162 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1999) (holding that intentionally setting fire to
couch on the porch of the insured residence did not constitute an "occurrence"
under policy); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bauer, 977 P.2d 617, 621 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that intentional shooting was not covered under definition of "occur-
rence").
3. Milbank Ins. Policy at 1.
4. Auto Owners Ins. Policy at 1 (on file with author).
5. Id. at 1.
6. E.g., Smith v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 10 S.W.3d 846, 850
(Ark. 2000) (stating that "provisions contained in a policy of insurance must
be construed most strongly against the insurance company which prepared it,
and if a reasonable construction may be given to the contract which would
1106 [Vol. 27:2
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initially make the policy appear all encompassing, yet later readings
reveal a multitude of exemptions to coverage. In other words, an
insured must read the fine print, or the exclusions. Consequently,
many case coverage decisions, both published and unpublished,
are decided on a literal interpretation of specific policy language .
Recently, in Walker v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.," an insured
attempted to collect under his homeowner's policy for his son's de-
fault on a promissory note. Walter Walker, Stuart Walker's son,
however, forged the promissory note. State Farm's homeowners in-
surance policy provided coverage for claims alleging bodily injury
or property damage caused by an "occurrence." Coincidentally,
the insured's umbrella policy was essentially identical. The debate
over coverage began when the bank took action against Stuart
Walker claiming that he was liable to the bank by reason of estop-
pel and intentional and negligent misrepresentation. Therefore,
the issue became whether the bank's claims against the insured al-
lege physical damage to or destruction of tangible property as out-
lined in the definition of occurrence. The court answered the
question in the negative because the only personal property in-
volved was the money.'o Since the insurance policy defined per-sonal property as, "discernible by the touch, or capable of being
justify recovery, it would be the duty of the court to do so"); Saucier v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 742 A.2d 482, 486 (Me. 1999) (stating that "[w]e construe insurance
policies liberally in favor of the insured and any ambiguity in the contract is
resolved against the insurer"); Griffin v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 18 S.W.3d 195,
200 (Tenn. 2000) (stating that the court will "construe provisions in an insur-
ance policy against the insurer and in favor of the insured so as to provide
coverage"); but see Nationwide Ins. Cos. v. Rhodes, 732 A.2d 388, 391 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1999) (holding that Maryland courts do not adhere to the rule of
strictly construing insurance policies against the drafter).
7. E.g., Norris v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 16 S.W.3d 242, 244 (Ark.
2000) (holding that "[t]he language in an insurance policy is to be construed in its
plain, ordinary, popular sense"); Wallis v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 723 N.E.2d 376,
381 (Il1. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that "[c]lear and unambiguous policy language
must be given its plain and ordinary meaning"); Whitt v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 734 N.E.2d 911, 914 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (stating that "[c]lear and unambigu-
ous policy language must be given its clear and ordinary meaning, not a distorted
meaning used to reach a desired result"); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Barrett,
530 S.E.2d 132, 135 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that "[w]hen a policy does not
specifically define a term, the term should be defined according to the usual un-
derstanding of the term's significance to the ordinary person").
8. 569 N.W.2d 542 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
9. Id. at 544.
10. Id. at 544-45.
2000] 1107
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touched", the Walker court reasoned personal property was the ac-
tual money, and not the promissory note. The court also rejected
the "loss of use" argument because it maintained that there must
be damage to physical property not simply interest in the prop-
erty.1 Finally, the court rejected the "reasonable expectations" ar-
gument made by the insured because there was no evidence that
the State Farm agent promised unlimited coverage.12
Likewise, in Rohrer v. Rick,13 the Minnesota Court of Appeals re-
jected the notion that prank phone calls could be construed as an
"occurrence." In Rohrer, the Traveler's insurance policy defined an
"occurrence" as an accident, which results in bodily injury or prop-
erty damage.14 There, the insured began making harassing phone
calls repeatedly to the Rohrer's home in the middle of the night.
After the trial court included findings of facts in its judgment that
Rick acted negligently, an award was entered for the Rohrers for
$49,000. The Rohrers then began collection proceedings against
Travelers. In rejecting the trial court's analysis, the court of ap-
peals relied on Milbank v. B.L.G. and Bituminous Casualty Corp. v.
Bartlett.15 Accordingly, the court stated that while Rick acted negli-
gently, he did not intend to harm the Rohrers, even though Rick
and the Rohrers entered into a stipulation stating Rick indeed
acted negligently. Rather, the court followed Gilman v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co.'6 Gilman stated that an insured's tackling a vic-
tim without his consent was not an accident even though the in-
sured had no intent to injure; the "proper analysis" is whether the
wrongful act or tortuous event was an accident. The Rohrer Court
further defined "occurrence" as an accident caused by ordinary
negligence. The issue of whether the insured had intent to harm
was irrelevant in this analysis. Therefore, although "occurrence"
cases will continue to be decided on a case-by-case basis, factual de-
terminations will not be absolute. Policy language will continue to
establish the parameters of coverage limitations. This analysis fol-
11. Id. at 544.
12. Id. at 545.
13. 529 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
14. Rohrer, 529 N.W.2d at 408.
15. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72, 77 n.5, 240 N.W.2d 310,
313 n.5 (1976); Milbank Ins. Co. v. B.L.G., 484 N.W.2d 52, 58 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992).
16. 526 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
17. Id. at 409.
1108 [Vol. 27:2
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lows notions of ordinary negligence.
II. AUTOMOBILE EXCLUSIONS
Noska Analysis
A recent problem, however, has been determining if liability
will arise when the accident in question contains elements of cov-
erage included in both homeowner's and auto insurance policies.
Although Waseca v. Noska18 answered part of the question by sepa-
rating what could happen independently from the intervening epi-
sode of driving an automobile, determining what exactly consti-
tutes an "occurrence" or accident remains difficult to discern.
An automobile exclusion is ordinarily included in the home-
owner's policy exceptions. For example, under a homeowner's pol-
icy, an insured will generally not recover for personal liability in an
auto accident unless the vehicle is owned by a third party. As such,
depending on the individual policy, an insurer will pay for damages
because of or arising out of the maintenance, use, loading or
unloading of only recreational vehicles or watercraft neither owned
by nor available for regular use by any insured.19 Generally, insur-
ers will cover losses for "motor vehicles not subject to registration
by a state regulatory agency, which are used primarily for servicing
and maintaining an insured premises," or any automobiles left in
dead storage. 20 However, this is not always the case. The insured
"premises" must also be the residence in some cases.
21In American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Van Gerpen, the in-
surer claimed there was no coverage under the automobile excep-
tion in the policy. There, a four-year old boy was thrown from a
tractor and killed on a parcel of land owned by the insured. The
insurer claimed that the tractor was not used for the service of the
insured residence and that the insured residence should not in-
clude the parcel of land where the accident occurred. The Court
agreed, stating "we do not believe that any reasonable layman
would understand the definition of 'residence' to encompass par-
cels of land which are devoid both of residents and of residential
18. 331 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. 1983).
19. Auto Owners Ins. Policy at 13 (on file with author).
20. Id.
21. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Gerpen, 151 F.3d 886, 887 (8th Cir.
1998).
20001 1109
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structures."22 Therefore, even though an insured actually owns the
property, coverage may not be available for losses occurring there.
In Waseca Mutual Insurance Co. v. Noska,13 the issue of concur-
rent causation was discussed. In Noska, an insured shoveled ashes
into barrels and placed the barrels on a trailer and then towed the
trailer. As the insured was driving the truck, ashes escaped from
the barrel and started fires adjacent to the highway.24 The Minne-
sota Supreme Court determined that the fires were the result of
two different acts, each of which was necessary to cause the dam-
25age. One distinct act, the negligent act of shoveling live embers
into the barrels was covered under the insured's homeowner policy
according to the Court.2 6 In addition, the negligent act of towing
the trailer with the barrels containing live embers was covered un-
der the insured's automobile liability policy. 27 Therefore, these two
acts were divisible even though the same person committed them
because two different persons could have done them. This analysis
has been used regularly in an attempt to cover large losses. Noska
was arguably a "result oriented decision"; the Noska court clearly
recognized the factual distinction of property damage greatly ex-
ceeding aggregate insurance coverage. Since Noska, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals has decided a number of cases which have estab-
lished precedent in allowing concurrent coverage. Noska's progeny
has been set forth as follows28:
*North Star Mutual Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 352 N.W.2d
791 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). An accident occurred when
the arm of a farm sprayer that was bolted to a pickup
truck came loose, striking a motor vehicle traveling in the
opposite direction. There was coverage under both a
farm policy and automobile policy because there were two
acts, one vehicle-related and one not;
*Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hoekman, 359
N.W.2d (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), rev. denied. There was con-
current coverage for injuries sustained by the collapse of a
22. Id. at 887-88.
23. Noska, 331 N.W.2d at 921.
24. Id. at 919.
25. Id. at 920.
26. Id. at923.
27. Id. at 920.
28. Mike Steenson, Triggering the No-Fault Act Lecture at William Mitchell
College of Law (January 25, 1999).
1110 [Vol. 27:2
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garage door after it was hit by a car;
*Jorgensen v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 360 N.W.2d 397
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985). The claimant was burned when a
can of gasoline stored in the trunk of his father's car ex-
ploded as he opened the trunk and he tried to remove it.
The court held that both the automobile liability and
homeowner's policies applied because there were two
acts, one vehicle-related and the other not;
*Pennsylvania General Insurance Co. v. Cegla, 381 N.W.2d
901 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied. The accident oc-
curred when a loose roll of wire mesh in Cegla's truck fell
onto the highway, causing a following motorcyclist to lose
control. The motorcyclist was hit by a following pickup
truck. The court held that the homeowner's insurance
company had to provide coverage because the act of plac-
ing the wire in the truck was a nonvehicle-related act. The
auto liability insurer did not deny coverage;
*Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Selisker, 435 N.W.2d 866
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989). The insured's failure to take
medication designed to control epileptic seizures was not
a "divisible concurring cause of the accident" qualifying as
"an independent nonvehicle-related act of negligence."
The court distinguished Noska because only one person
could have committed the two acts;
*State Farm Insurance Cos. v. Seefeld, 481 N.W.2d 62
(Minn. 1992). The claimant was injured while riding in a
negligently constructed utility trailer pulled by a four
wheel ATV. The court held that the negligent design and
construction of the utility trailer was not an independent,
nonvehicle-related, concurring cause of injuries that fell
within coverage of mobile homeowner's policy;
*Vang v. Vang, 490 N.W.2d 647 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992),
rev. denied. Failure to warn of a defective barn door was a
separate cause from the negligent driving of motor vehi-
cle that coincided with the failure to warn to cause the
death of the decedent, justifying a finding of coverage
under a farm liability policy.
*Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co. v. Northern Lights
Sports, 1995 WL 46308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995): "We hold
that when the insured provides racer support services in
order to benefit the insured's business and, in doing so,
loads a van with tools and spare parts and drives along the
2000] ]III
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route of the bicycle race providing mechanical assistance
and rides to race participants, failure to provide spotters
to warn of the presence of the van and its occupants is in-
extricably intertwined with the use of a motor vehicle and
thus is excluded from coverage under the general liability
insurance policy's motor vehicle exclusion." 9
*Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Goertzen, 1996 WL
175799 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). The insured purchased
alcohol for minors who drank the alcohol and became in-
volved in an accident when one of the minors negligently
drove a motor vehicle. The homeowner's coverage of the
insured was inapplicable because of the motor vehicle ex-
clusion in the homeowner's policy. The court of appeals
read the dual coverage cases narrowly:
In Seefeld, the Supreme Court limited the application of Noska
to causes that arise independently of each other and that could op-
erate independently of a motor vehicle to cause the accident. Go-
ertzen's homeowner's insurance policy expressly excludes coverage
for bodily injury or property damage that results from the use of a
motor vehicle. The injuries underlying this lawsuit resulted from a
motor vehicle accident. As in Seefeld, Goertzen's act of furnishing
alcohol to a minor could not have operated independently of a mo-
tor vehicle to cause injuries that occurred in a motor vehicle acci-
dent.
In Austin Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kande,3° the Minnesota Court
of Appeals reversed a District Court ruling that allowed the insurer
to recover damages under the failure to supervise a child theory.
Oftentimes this theory is referred to as negligent supervision. In
Kande, nine-year-old invited guest of the insured attempted to get
on a motorcycle, which had just previously been ridden. The kick-
stand gave out, and the boy was burned when his leg came into
contact with the hot muffler. Although the boy's mother did not
bring an action against the insureds, Austin Mutual brought a de-
claratory judgment action against the insureds and the mother,
Rhonda Kande seeking a declaration that it had no obligation to
defend or to indemnify the insureds for Rodney's injuries.3 ' The
insured argued that the motorized vehicle exception did not pre-
29. Northern Lights, 1995 WL 46308 at *2.
30. 563 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
31. Id. at 283.
1112 [Vol. 27:2
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clude recovery under a negligent supervision claim and that there
basically is a concurrent causation situation as in Noska. However,
in Kande the motorcycle was not being used for transportation pur-
poses at the time of injury but had been recently used before the
accident. Therefore, the Court determined that the motorcycle
was "more than the situs of the injury and the use of the vehicle for
transportation was an indirect cause of his injures.,
2
While the plain language of an insurance contract may ex-
clude all injuries caused by an insured's use of a motor vehicle, the
Noska analysis will allow recovery where a covered risk and an un-
covered risk concur in causing the injury. Minnesota courts have
recognized that certain fact situations involving separate acts of
negligence that arise independently should allow recovery. Conse-
quently, the logical extension of the Minnesota Court of Appeals
holdings' is that dual coverage cases will continue to be narrowly
construed in the future.
In Christie v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 3 the court of appeals held
that there was no homeowner's insurance coverage for a snowmo-
bile accident involving the insured's snowmobile being driven by
Christie because it fell under the "motor vehicle" exception. The
court further held that the reasonable expectations doctrine was
inapplicable. The district court, in deciphering the insurance pol-
icy, stated that a snowmobile was not applicable as a "motorized
land vehicle" because "land" could be construed as on "earth" as
opposed to snow or ice.
Correctly, the court of appeals disagreed, looking to the obvi-
ous intent of the insurance policy to distinguish between vehicles
for use in air or on water, not between vehicles used on land. In
fact, the actual policy excluded coverage for "any other motorized
land vehicle designed for recreational use off public roads."
34
However, Illinois Farmers listed an exception to this exclusion,
which included in its coverage motorized land vehicles not subject
to motor vehicle registration and used only on an insured location.
The court of appeals agreed with the insurer in determining that
snowmobiles do not fit into this exception because they are com-
monly used on locations other than an insured's premises, or off
public roads. Conversely, the insured argued that the snowmobile
32. Id. at 284-85.
33. 580 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
34. Id. at 508.
20001 1113
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was restricted to the insured location, attempting to gain coverage
under the unregistered motorized land vehicle used "only on in-
sured's property."3  However, the insurance company successfully
argued that the proper definition is within a "recreational vehicle"
and not within definition of the intended farm machinery or riding
lawn motors covered under the policy.
Finally, the court, in citing Sicoli v. State Farm Insurance 6 stated
there simply is no reasonable expectation of coverage for a snow-
mobile. The reasonable expectations doctrine provides that when
the application of policy language would be contrary to the objec-
tively reasonable expectations of an insured, courts will interpret
the policy according to those reasonable expectations, "even
though a painstaking study of the policy would have negated those
expectations. 3 7 Generally, separate insurance is available to pro-
vide coverage for snowmobiles and four-wheelers.
III. NAMED INSURED
Homeowner's insurance policies provide coverage for the
named insured in the policy, as well as for relatives or any other
person under the age of 21 residing with the insured who is in the
insured's care or the care of a relative. In North Star Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Raincloud,3 9 a cabin guest did not qualify as an "insured"
for an accident that occurred when she took control of the owners'
ATV. Roxanne Raincloud, her two children, and a friend, went to
visit insureds Richard and Donna Lian at the Lians' cabin. Rain-
cloud was consuming alcohol at the time of the accident. The
Lians gave Raincloud's daughter, Alicia, permission to ride the
Lians' ATV. Roxanne then proceeded to go outside and ride on
the ATV, apparently without asking permission for herself. She
had both children on the back of the ATV when she lost control,
causing it to rollover onto her daughter Amy, who died a short time
later.
For purposes of recreational vehicle coverage, the Lians'
homeowner's policy, issued by North Star Mutual defined an "in-
35. Id. at 509.
36. 464 N.W.2d 300, 303 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
37. Christie, 580 N.W.2d at 509 (citing Atwater Creamery v. Western Nat'l Mut.
Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985)).
38. Auto Owners Policy at I (on file with author).
39. 563 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 1997).
1114 [Vol. 27:2
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sured" as including persons using an ATV with the Lians' consent.40
An endorsement to the insurance policy excluded from its defini-
tion of insured "a person using an ATV without the Lians' permis-
sion."4' The issue then was whether Roxanne Raincloud had im-
plied consent to ride the ATV since the Lians had give permission
to her daughter, Alicia. The court, citing Milbank Mutual Insurance
Co. v. United Stated Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,42 stated that had Rox-
anne Raincloud been driving a motor vehicle, she would have been
an insured under the respondent's policies. This analysis is taken
from the Safety Responsibility Act, which ensures that innocent ac-
cident victims are compensated by making an owner as well as an
operator of a motor vehicle responsible for the behavior of the op-
erator.43 The court also noted the trend to give the Act a liberal
construction to effectuate its policy considerations.4 Interpreting
the court's decision, "consent" is given where there is implied or
express consent, making the oFerator an agent of the owner of the
motorized vehicle in question.
However, the court did not extend this policy to ATVs. In his
dissent, Justice Randall queries why the initial permission rule, stat-
ing that an ATV was not a motor vehicle and thus not under the
46scope of the Safety Responsibility Act. The ATV was insured un-
der the homeowner's policy for the protection of the homeowner
on his premises. The Court's analysis, while initially relying heavily
upon the Safety Responsibility Act, fails to recognize that the Mil-
bank analysis could be applied outside the scope of the Safety Re-
sponsibility Act for all motorized vehicles.
In Raincloud there may have been implied consent in light of
the fact that Raincloud's daughter had consent. The analysis
should end at that point because, as the Court states, the home-
owner's policy is meant to protect not the general welfare of the
public, but the homeowner's own protection. Here, the insured
received no protection. Justice Randall states that the initial per-
mission coverage on automobiles should be "employed at least as
40. Id. at 271.
41. Id. at 271.
42. 332 N.W 2d 160 (Minn. 1983).
43. Raincloud, 563 N.W.2d at 272 (citing Milbank, 332 N.W.2d at 165).
44. Milbank, 332 N.W.2d at 165-66.
45. MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (1996).
46. Raincloud, 563 N.W.2d at 272.
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stringently, if not more so, on ATV's."47 This is a noteworthy analy-
sis since ATVs are commonly used on public roads and should be
afforded the same legislative safety protection.
Earlier, in Lott v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the Minnesota
Supreme Court addressed the resident relative language of an in-
surance policy. There, Lott was at a party in which participants
were drinking alcohol and jumping into the lake. In spite of the
fact that Lott did not want to get wet, Scott Roesler threw Lott off a
dock into the lake. As a result, Lott sustained a fracture in his right
ankle, bone chips in the fracture area, and internal blood clots.
Roesler's mother, Zona, owned and insured the property. Roesler
lived in Fargo but kept a speedboat at his mother's cabin. Because
Roesler's mother owned the property, State Farm argued that Scott
Roesler was not a resident of the household and therefore not a
named insured. This was a difficult case because the premises
happened to be a summer home with family members coming and
going and the question of who qualified as an insured was set forth
as dubious at best.
IV. INTENTIONAL ACTS
Most homeowner's insurance policies exclude losses for inten-
tional acts by the insured. As in B.L. G.,49 the intentional act analysis
is not an easy one to apply. Generally, where there is "either actual
intent to inflict bodily injury or such an intent can be inferred as a
matter of law, the intentional act exclusion applies even if the in-
jury caused is more severe or of a different nature than the injury
intended."50 Unlike criminal acts exclusions, the intentional act
exclusion is more difficult to identify. For instance, in Casperson v.
Webber," the plaintiff was working as a hat check girl at a restaurant
when the defendant, the insured, assaulted her. The facts show he
was unable to find his claim check and when plaintiff refused to
look for his coat, he pushed her aside, forcing plaintiff to lose her
balance and injure herself. After the plaintiff brought an action
against the defendant alleging both assault and negligence, the in-
surance company refused to pay the claim, citing the intentional
47. Id. at 274.
48. 541 N.W.2d 304 (Minn. 1995).
49. Milbank Ins. Co. v. B.L.G., 484 N.W.2d 52, 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
50. Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Stone, 269 N.W.2d 885, 887 (Minn. 1978).
51. Casperson v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (Minn. 1973).
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act exclusion.2
While the trial court found the intentional injury exception
applied, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding the as-
sault and battery was not within the exclusion unless a reason for
the act was to inflict bodily injury.
In Milbank Insurance Co. v. B.L.G.,54 the court of appeals re-
jected the insurer's argument that giving herpes to another person
is "expected and intended" for exclusionary purposes under the
homeowner's policy. According to the court in B.L.G., even if an
injury is "foreseeable," it may still be an accident for purposes of an
insurance policy. The court, syntactically splitting hairs, also goes
on to state that an accident can include all negligently caused in-
jury as long as it was not intentional. Here, according to the facts,
shortly before M.M.D contracted herpes, B.L.G. had been treated
for herpes, therefore knowing he had a communicable sexually
transmitted disease. In other words, B.L.G. knew he was a carrier,
yet intentionally slept with a woman, knowing she too would likely
contract the disease. Contracting herpes then should be construed
as "expected." The issue then seems to be whether or not a rea-
sonable, prudent person would fail to disclose this fact to another
person with whom he intended to sleep. If not, then contraction of
herpes would indeed be purely "accidental." If so, it seems like an
intentional act. (Note the Rohrer Court did not follow B.L. G., infra,
however, where coverage turned on negligent behavior without an
intent to harm. It is difficult to see where these two cases differ,
unless it is purely politically motivated.
Earlier, in Gilman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the Minne-55
sota Court of Appeals addressed the issue of occurrence. In Gil-
man, the plaintiffs were in the process of moving from their resi-
dence. Frank and Gail Gilman went to the bar for beers where they
met Brian Larson, a friend of Gail and Jeff Gilman. Brian subse-
quently came over to the residence. Jeff left and then Gail left the
party, went home and her husband assaulted her. Later, she re-
turned to the party. After seeing her condition, Brian wanted to go
find Jeff, and Frank tried to stop him. The two struggled and fell to
52. Id. at 96, 329.
53. Id. at 98, 330.
54. B.L.G., 484 N.W.2d at 59.
55. Gilman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995).
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the ground. Frank then got up and Brian tackled him. During the
56tackle, Frank suffered a broken ankle. He filed suit against Brian.
The issue was whether this was an occurrence, or an accident. The
policy describes as an accident as "exposure to conditions, which
results in bodily injury. ,'" The interrogatories submitted to the jury
asked as follows:
1. Was the incident in which Frank Gilman and Brian Larson
involved an accident?
2. Did Brian Larson intend to injure anyone?
The jury answered "no" to both questions.
The Gilmans argued that there was no difference between the
two questions, because if the injury was unintentional then it was ac-
cidental. The Gilmans therefore claimed that since the jury found
the injury unintentional, they were entitled to judgment as matter of
law. However, the Court of Appeals stated that the jury could find
that Larson intended to tackle Gilman but that he did not intend to
injure him. Thus, determining what constitutes an accident was just
as difficult as in B.L. G.. The trial court stated that an "accident" is an
"unexpected, unforeseen or undesigned happening" and that it "in-
cludes all negligently caused injury, provided such injury was not in-
tentional., 58 However, the court of appeals, citing B.L. G., stated that
negligently transmitting herpes was an accident. It goes on to distin-
guish Hauenstein because it involved property damages and that there
was no wrongful conduct on the part of the insured. This is a faulty
distinction, because it goes on to attempt to distinguish Milbank from
this case by stating that it was a tort, an assault that was the cause of
the injury. 9 The court stated that the "proper analysis requires the
fact-finder to determine whether the wrongful or tortuous event was
an accident."
6
1
This syntactical splicing operatively turns on an apparently sim-
ple analysis into an insured's nightmare. It leaves everyone involved
to guess whether simple negligence is the standard or whether a
more convoluted definition of accident, which includes wrongdoing
and tortious acts is the standard. Negligence can be neither wrong-
doing nor tortious, but it also may be both. This is obvious.
56. Id. at 380.
57. Id. at 381.
58. Id. at 382.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 383.
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V. RESIDENT RELATIVE
Determining whether an alleged insured is a resident relative
may be determined by examining the policy to ascertain whether the
alleged insured lived under the same roof as the named insured, in a• • 61
close, intimate, and informal relationship. Other relevant factors
include the alleged insured's age, her level of self-sufficiency, the fre-
quency and duration of her stays in the family home, whether she has
established a separate residence and if so, whether she intends to re-
61turn to the family home.
In an unpublished opinion, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
reaffirmed the Minnesota Courts' three-factor test in determining
63residency in an insured's household. The court rejected the ar-
gument that since the Haeflingers listed their son on the umbrella
application it satisfied the third prong of Viktora (citing State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Short). The court stated the relevant time to
examine family relationships is at the time of the accident, rather
than at the time that the insured contracts for insurance. 6
4
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Duel, a recent unpublished
opinion, the issue of determining "when" was again addressed.65
There, Duel severely injured Shawn Reed by shooting him with a
shotgun. Duel and Reed subsequently entered into a Miller-
Shugart agreement whereby Duel agreed to a judgment against
her, to be paid from her parents' homeowner's insurance policy is-
sued by State Farm. Yet, the Court held that Duel's act was inten-
tional and therefore excluded from coverage. The facts show that
Duel moved into her own apartment building thereby "severing"
her from her parental responsibility. But the court in this case also
analyzed intentional act exclusions. The homeowner's policy ex-
cluded intentional acts which would be established by: (1) proof of
an actual intent to injure; or (2) evidence that the character of the
act is such that intent to inflict injury may be inferred as a matter of
61. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Viktora, 318 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Minn.
1982).
62. Wood v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 415 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987).
63. State Farm Ins. Co. v. Haeflinger, No. C6-97-1047, 1997 WL 739403, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 2,1997).
64. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Short, 459 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Minn. 1990).
65. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Duel, No. C7-98-208, 1998 WL 531821, at *3
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1998).
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law.66 In Duel, under the language of the insurance policy, the
Court concluded that Duel intended as a matter of law to injure
Reed.6 7
In Allstate v. Burrough,6s an insured attempted to gain coverage
when Burrough stole his grandfather's gun and gave it to a friend
who in turn shot a boy in the neck. The insured's homeowner's
policy included an exclusion for criminal acts. It states, "we do not
cover any bodily injury or property damage intended by, or which
may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or
criminal acts or omissions of, any insured person." 69 This exclusion
applies even if the person is not actually charged. The court con-
cluded that notwithstanding the fact that Burrough was not
charged, Burrough should "have reasonably expected that an inci-
dent like the one that took place would happen.,,7
VI. NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION
In Redeemer Covenant Church v. Church Mutual Insurance 
Co.,71
sex abuse victims brought an action against their church for negli-
gently retaining and failing to supervise the pastor who committed
the abuse.7 ' The court of appeals held that exclusionary language
in the church's policy did not apply to the church on three differ-
ent grounds. First, the relevant policy provisions excluded from
coverage "any criminal or malicious act or omission of any insured"
and "licentious immoral or sexual behavior intended to lead to or
culminating in any sexual act. ,7 Second, the church was not the
perpetrator of the excluded criminal or licentious acts. Third, the
church's exposure for liability was for negligent supervision.
Therefore, the relevant exclusions in Redeemer did not contain
"arising out of' language, but excluded from coverage criminal acts
and licentious behavior.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently addressed this dis-
tinction in an unpublished case, Metropolitan Property & Casualty In-
66. Duel, 1998 WL 531821, at *2 (citing Woida v. North Star Mut. Ins. Co., 306
N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 1981)).
67. Id.
68. 120 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 1997).
69. Id. at 836.
70. Id. at 840.
71. 567 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
72. Id. at 74.
73. Id. at 77.
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surance Co. & Affiliates v. Miller, stating, "the drafter of the insur-
ance policy could have drafted its exclusions to cover injury or li-
ability arising out of criminal acts of licentious behavior, but it did
not do so. There, the court affirmed a district court holding that
a minor could not recover for negligent supervision against her
mother based on a claim of sexual abuse perpetrated by her father.
The court basically focused on the father's conduct rather than the
mother's failure to prevent abuse, stating that the severability
clause allows "each claim to be considered for coverage independ-
ently." However, in his dissent, Judge Schumacher rightfully points
out that Redeemer is distinguishable because it dealt with a profes-
sional liability insurance policy, which is more likely to cover acts of
negligent supervision which was part of the insured's professional
duty.
Most insurance policies avoid court interpretation of such ex-
ceptions by excluding acts reasonably expected or intended by the
insured.6
VII. CONCLUSION
This article was written as a guide to understanding emerging
issues in General Insurance Law. Certain cases were highlighted
and discussed in an effort to identify developing trends as set forth
by Minnesota Courts. Definitional expansions and contractions are
occurring constantly. Consequently, similar fact situations may
have vastly different results. Assuredly, future decisions will create
additional impact upon insurance policy language.
74. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. & Affiliates v. Miller, No. C6-97-2070, 1998
WL 157358, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1998).
75. Id. at *4.
76. E.g., Milbank and Auto Owners policies (on file with author).
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